Myerson derived a simple and elegant solution to the single-parameter revenue-maximization problem in his seminal work on optimal auction design assuming the usual model of quasi-linear utilities. In this paper, we consider a slight generalization of...
In repeated games, such as auctions, players rely on autonomous learning agents to choose their actions. We study settings in which players have their agents make monetary transfers to other agents during play at their own expense, in order to influe...
Pennsylvania's 17 casinos: In early 2018 auctions began for licenses of Category 4 mini casinos, otherwise known as satellite casinos. Although ten licenses
Media publisher platforms often face an effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff: more annoying ads can be more effective for some advertisers because of their ability to attract attention, but after attracting viewers' attention, their nuisance to viewers ca...
In two-sided markets, Myerson and Satterthwaite's impossibility theorem states that one can not maximize the gain-from-trade while also satisfying truthfulness, individual-rationality and no deficit. Attempts have been made to circumvent Myerson and...
internet escrow services for many companies in e-commerce, international trade, online auctions, and online shopping, such as eBay, GoDaddy and AutoTrader
We study the problem of characterizing revenue optimal auctions for single-minded buyers. Each buyer is interested only in a specific bundle of items and has a value for the same. Both his bundle and its value are his private information. The bundles...
We consider an auction design problem where a seller sells multiple homogeneous items to a set of connected buyers. Each buyer only knows the buyers she directly connects with and has a diminishing marginal utility valuation for the items. The seller...
In this research note, we lay some groundwork for analyzing the manipulability of core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions. In particular, we focus on payment rules based on the bidders' Shapley values. We define a sensitivity metric, a...
Hypothetical Bias in Elicitation Procedures? Evidence from Field Auctions for Sportscards,” American Economic Review (2001), 91(5): 1498–1507. List, John A. and
In financial applications, latency advantages - the ability to make decisions later than others, even without the ability to see what others have done - can provide individual participants with an edge by allowing them to gather additional relevant i...
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In this paper we propose a multilevel model specification with time series components for the analysis of prices of artworks sold at auctions. Since auction data do not constitute a panel or a time series but are composed of repeated cross-sections t...
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We study the efficiency guarantees in the simple auction environment where the auctioneer has one unit of divisible good to be distributed among a number of budget constrained agents. With budget constraints, the social welfare cannot be approximated...
This paper establishes the Price of Stability (PoS) for First Price Auctions, for all equilibrium concepts that have been studied in the literature: Bayes Nash Equilibrium $\subsetneq$ Bayes Correlated Equilibrium $\subsetneq$ Bayes Coarse Correlated...